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Abstract
This comment argues that instead of worrying about the pros and cons of whistleblowing one should focus on the 
more general problem of the failure of upward communication around safety and quality problems and consider 
what leaders and managers must do to stimulate subordinates to communicate and reward such communication. 
The article analyzes why safety failures occur and introduces the concept of practical drift and adaptive moves as 
necessary for systemic safety to be understood and better handled. It emphasizes the key role of senior leadership in 
creating a climate in which critical upward communication will become more likely. 
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The problem that Mannion and Davies1 identify can be stated as the intrinsic difficulty of upward communication across hierarchic or professional 
status boundaries. It is in the nature of hierarchy and status to 
assume that the person in higher authority now has the license 
to tell others what to do. It is the “divine right of managers” 
to tell rather than to ask and listen, and to perceive whistle 
blowers as malcontents and trouble-makers, “wimps” who see 
safety hazards everywhere, or as people who see only the bad 
things in the organization. 
When managers do have to listen because the problem 
has blown up into a scandal, they immediately see it as “an 
exception,” try to “identify and get rid of the few bad apples 
in the barrel who are doing things wrong,” and vehemently 
remind everyone of all the good things that are going on. 
There is little appetite in leadership to question their own 
position, to make themselves vulnerable by acknowledging 
that subordinates may know things and may see systemic 
things that are critical to improving the overall functioning 
of the organization. Leaders prefer root cause analysis and to 
locate people to blame rather than examining the systemic 
forces at work that cause bad things to happen from time 
to time. This reluctance to ask and listen goes on in all 
organizations because we have evolved in the United States 
a culture of leadership and management built around the 
“divine right of managers.”2 
To “fix” this problem will require a series of what I refer to 
as “adaptive moves.”3 The first of these is to take a different 
approach to the analysis of scandals and accidents such as 
patient deaths. Instead of  looking for root causes and people 
to blame, assume that people acted in good faith based on their 
assessment of the situation at the moment. Accept what safety 
experts have shown over and over again — that actions and 
ultimate results are “over-determined,” that what we do and 
what ultimately happens always has multiple causes. Many of 
the examples in the recent book Case Studies in Patient Safety 
show how patient deaths result from the complex interactions 
of doctors, nurses, and patients in surgery, intensive care, 
normal hospitalization and home care, not some discrete 
action that might warrant whistle blowing.4 
Work in real situations such as in the hospital will always 
experience some amount of “practical drift” — a deviation 
from desired behavior or what the rules require because of 
local circumstances that make it necessary for people to use 
their own judgment and sometimes choose to break the rule 
to “get the job done.”5 For example, in a power company, 
electrical workers broke the rule that “you must always wear 
your safety glasses” when they found, on hot humid summer 
days, that they could not do their work because their glasses 
steamed up. The adaptive move here was to redesign the 
glasses instead of punishing the workers for breaking the rule. 
A hospital example was a resident going to the pharmacy in 
the middle of the night to mix a dose of medicine that a cancer 
patient had not been given. The justification for this illegal 
and dangerous action was “professional duty” to the patient.
The point is that practical drift can be harmful and reflect 
negligence or actually helpful if it is motivated by sense of 
obligation. In either case, what is missing that management 
must address, is the upward communication of these events 
and correlated examples of “near misses” and “close calls” so 
that the system can be better understood and adaptive moves 
made. 
The main adaptive move would be to ask senior management 
to become more mindful of how they react to subordinate 
comments about safety or quality. Do they welcome inputs 
from subordinates, do they encourage them, reward them, 
and acknowledge their importance, or do they feel that “it 
is the subordinate’s ‘professional responsibility’ to speak up 
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whenever they see something amiss” and otherwise assume 
that no news is good news. When I have spoken to subordinates 
I find all too often that their view is quite different. They do 
not feel obligated to tell the boss when they see something 
hazardous or amiss for any of the following reasons: (1) “The 
last time I tried to tell the boss something, he was too busy;” 
(2) “He listened and said he would take care of it but never did 
anything;” (3) “He said ‘don’t bring me problems unless you 
have a solution;’” and (4) “He said not to worry about it, it is 
not a serious issue.” 
Hopefully not every boss creates such a negative climate, 
but even in very safe organizations when I ask subordinates, 
“Do you tell your boss when you see something wrong?” I 
am shocked by how many of them say without hesitation, “Of 
course not.” Every organization should have some neutral 
parties go around the organization whose role is to ask 
various employees this question and provide the feedback to 
the managers. There is deep wisdom in the Arabian Nights 
story that the Caliph of Bagdad periodically put on beggar’s 
clothes and went down into the city to find out what was 
really going on because his immediate subordinates clearly 
had no incentive to tell him the truth.
Another adaptive move is to learn to pay attention to what 
in the safety literature are called “weak signals.”6 Blatant 
problems that end up with whistle blowing or fatal accidents 
are usually preceded by small problems that are detected but 
are less likely to be reported or taken seriously. For example, 
tensions between surgeons and nurses that a new nurse might 
observe immediately would be examples of such weak signals 
that are often ignored. Minor deviations from procedures, the 
practical drift referred to above, would be another example. 
An interesting adaptive move by a manager would be to 
bring her subordinates together just to identify and discuss 
the implications for safety and quality of various weak signals 
that they detect.
The most important adaptive move by the leader or the 
higher status person is to “personalize” his relationship 
with the subordinates, get to know them as individuals 
rather than as occupants of technical or professional roles. 
In my forthcoming book “Humble Consulting”3 I propose 
that unless we personalize relationships across hierarchical 
boundaries, the subordinate will never feel entirely safe in 
bringing up negative information. Mutual trust and openness 
are crucial components of a working relationship yet all too 
often “professional distance” actually works against being 
open and trusting. This does not imply intimacy or even close 
friendship but the acceptance of another human being with 
whom we are dealing as a total person, welcoming openness 
around work-related issues rather than displaying impatience 
or irritation when someone speaks up. 
It is the combination of “professional distance” and the 
attitude of the “divine right of managers” that ultimately 
create the conditions that cause some employees to become 
whistleblowers. The solution is to create conditions where 
there is no need for whistleblowers because the degree of 
personalization, openness and trust causes undesirable 
behavior to be noticed, reported, and dealt with as a problem 
of systemic learning rather than blame and punishment.
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